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@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ To show where these effects are concentrated geographically, Figure 4 maps distr
 
 ![District Treatment Effects Map](district_treatment_effects_map_psj.png)
 **Figure 4.** Geographic distribution of district treatment effects (percent change in days to enforcement).
+**Figure note.** Districts are shaded by the estimated percent change in days to enforcement after 2019 (negative values indicate faster enforcement; positive values indicate slower enforcement), using a diverging scale centered at zero so improvements and slowdowns are visually comparable. Estimates come from the district-by-post model on logged enforcement delay and are converted to percent changes; district labels indicate RRC district codes. Magnitudes should be interpreted with the coefficient uncertainty reported in the corresponding model tables.
 
 The map indicates that large positive and negative effects coexist across regions, reinforcing the need to model district-level discretion explicitly rather than assuming uniform policy implementation.
 
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ In the conditional heterogeneity model (Model 3):
 
 - Offshore-by-post-policy differential = **0.3819**, p<0.001.
 
-This indicates that, net of district-specific post effects, offshore-jurisdiction districts experience relatively slower post-policy enforcement timing.
+This estimand is the average post-2019 offshore differential conditional on district-specific post-policy effects. Because the outcome is logged enforcement delay, the coefficient implies an approximate $(e^{0.3819}-1 \approx 46.5\%)$ relative increase in time-to-enforcement for offshore-regulating districts, holding the rest of the specification constant. Read jointly with the annual offshore differential results (Table C3 in the appendix), this pooled estimate should be interpreted as an average over uneven yearly effects, with the strongest divergences concentrated in 2023-2024. Substantively, H5 is supported as a structured heterogeneity result within the all-district analysis, but it should not be interpreted as isolating a single offshore causal mechanism, given that offshore jurisdiction is concentrated in districts 02/03/04.
 
 ### H3: Structural moderators