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Introduction
Regulatory enforcement in borderlands jurisdictions is often expected to differ from interior jurisdictions due to administrative constraints, multi-jurisdictional exposure, and monitoring frictions. This manuscript analyzes Texas Railroad Commission district-year outcomes (2015-2025) to assess whether border-exposed districts show systematic enforcement gaps and whether those gaps changed after the 2019 disclosure reform.
The empirical design centers on two research questions from the notebook:
- RQ1 (Border gaps): Do border-exposed Texas districts differ from non-border districts in enforcement intensity and pipeline outcomes?
- RQ2 (Disclosure heterogeneity): Did the 2019 disclosure reform change enforcement outcomes differently in border districts versus non-border districts (level shift and post-policy trend differential)?
Theory
We use a borderlands governance framing with two linked mechanisms: capacity asymmetry and transparency-throughput effects. The corresponding hypotheses are:
- H1 (Border inspection gap): Border districts have lower inspection intensity than non-border districts.
- H2 (Border pipeline disadvantage): Border districts show weaker enforcement pipeline outcomes (higher violations per inspection and/or slower timing and/or lower resolution rates).
- H3 (Disclosure heterogeneity in levels): Post-2019 level shifts differ between border and non-border districts (
post_2019:border). - H4 (Disclosure heterogeneity in trends): Post-2019 trend shifts differ between border and non-border districts (
post_trend:border).
This yields a core empirical claim: post-2019 border effects should be strongest in enforcement timing rather than in inspection coverage or resolution outcomes.
Methods
Data and Unit of Analysis
- Unit: district-year.
- Coverage: 13 Texas RRC districts, 2015-2025.
- Source tables:
well_shape_tract,inspections,violations. - Sample in current run: 1,010,432 wells; 1,867,859 inspections; 191,762 violations; 143 district-year observations.
Border Measurement: District Coding and Well Proximity
We use two complementary border constructions.
- District-level baseline treatment (
border_district): districts in the predefined border-adjacent set (01,02,06,08,8A,09,10) are coded 1; others are coded 0. - Well-level proximity treatment: each well is classified by spatial proximity to border segments, then rolled up to district-year exposure shares.
Well-level proximity was constructed from latitude/longitude and shapefiles as follows:
- Texas-Mexico distance/flags from
WellAnalyzer(within_25km_texmex,within_50km_texmex). - Additional state-border segments (TX-NM, TX-OK, TX-LA) built from Texas county boundary geometry and seed lines.
- Distances computed in projected CRS (EPSG:5070), then threshold flags generated at 25 km and 50 km.
- Composite exposure indicators created:
within_50km_state_border_anywell_border_exposed(1 if within 50 km of TX-MX or any TX-state border segment).
District-year well-proximity exposure is measured as:
ShareBorder_{dt} = \frac{BorderExposedInspections_{dt}}{Inspections_{dt}}
and an alternative district treatment is defined as border_exposure_district = 1 when ShareBorder_{dt} \ge 0.25.
Outcomes
InspectionIntensity_{dt} = \frac{Inspections_{dt}}{UniqueWells_{dt}}
ViolPerInsp_{dt} = \frac{Violations_{dt}}{Inspections_{dt}}
DaysToEnf_{dt} = \frac{1}{N_{dt}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{dt}} (EnforcementDate_i - ViolationDiscoveryDate_i)
ResolutionRate_{dt} = \frac{CompliantOnReinspection_{dt}}{Violations_{dt}}
Exposure Definitions
- Baseline treatment:
border_district(binary district border status). - Additional robustness exposures:
- Border-type indicators (
TX-MX,TX-NM,TX-OK,TX-LA) - Continuous exposure share:
ShareBorder_{dt} = \frac{BorderExposedInspections_{dt}}{Inspections_{dt}}
- Cutoff sensitivity with 25/75/100 km thresholds.
Estimating Equations
RQ1 levels:
Y_{dt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Border_d + \beta_2 \log(UniqueWells_{dt}) + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{dt}
RQ2 FE interaction:
Y_{dt} = \alpha_d + \gamma_t + \theta_1(Post2019_t \times Border_d) + \theta_2(PostTrend_t \times Border_d) + \varepsilon_{dt}
Post2019_t = \mathbb{1}[t \ge 2019], \quad PostTrend_t = \max(0, t-2019)
Inference uses district-clustered standard errors (13 clusters), with emphasis on effect size and consistency across specifications.
Tests Run in Notebook
The notebook estimated the following test families:
- Descriptive border-gap tests:
- Border vs non-border means for inspection intensity, violations per inspection, days to enforcement, and resolution rate.
- RQ1 levels regressions (border gaps):
- Outcomes:
inspection_intensity,violations_per_inspection. - Specification:
border_district + log_unique_wells + C(year).
- Outcomes:
- RQ2 FE interaction regressions (post-2019 heterogeneity):
- Outcomes:
inspection_intensity,violations_per_inspection,avg_days_to_enforcement,resolution_rate. - Specification:
C(district) + C(year) + post_2019:border_district + post_trend:border_district.
- Outcomes:
- Border-type robustness tests:
- District profiles for
TX-MX,TX-NM,TX-OK,TX-LAexposure. - RQ1-style levels with
has_tx_*indicators. - RQ2-style FE interactions with
post_2019:has_tx_*andpost_trend:has_tx_*.
- District profiles for
- Continuous-exposure robustness tests:
- Replace binary border indicator with
share_border_exposed_inspin both RQ1-style and RQ2-style specifications.
- Replace binary border indicator with
- Cutoff-sensitivity tests:
- Recompute proximity exposure from minimum distance to any border at 25 km, 75 km, and 100 km.
- Estimate RQ1-style models for inspection intensity and RQ2-style timing interaction models.
- Visualization and reporting tests:
- Border/non-border trend plots.
- Main timing figure with district-year group means and 95% confidence intervals.
- Competition/reaction-function scaffolding (not estimated as causal model):
- District-to-competitor jurisdiction link table and template generated for future interstate stringency integration.
Analysis
Descriptive Border Gaps
| Outcome | Non-border | Border |
|---|---|---|
| Inspection intensity | 1.515 | 1.329 |
| Violations per inspection | 0.098 | 0.130 |
| Mean days to enforcement | 122.8 | 145.2 |
| Mean resolution rate | 0.596 | 0.543 |
Descriptively, border districts show weaker enforcement conditions across coverage, detection conditional on inspection, timing, and follow-through.
Main Regression Evidence
| Model | Coefficient | p-value | N |
|---|---|---|---|
RQ1: border_district on inspection_intensity |
-0.1755 | 0.0999 | 143 |
RQ1: border_district on violations_per_inspection |
0.0434 | 0.0949 | 143 |
RQ2: post_2019:border on inspection_intensity |
-0.1191 | 0.0753 | 143 |
RQ2: post_2019:border on violations_per_inspection |
0.0040 | 0.8881 | 143 |
RQ2: post_2019:border on avg_days_to_enforcement |
-74.5893 | 0.0156 | 143 |
RQ2: post_2019:border on resolution_rate |
0.0404 | 0.4520 | 143 |
The most stable differential post-2019 effect is a border-specific improvement in enforcement timing.
Results
Hypothesis Tests
| Hypothesis | Test evidence | Decision (current run) |
|---|---|---|
| H1: Border districts have lower inspection intensity | RQ1: border_district -> inspection_intensity = -0.1755, p = 0.0999; descriptives 1.329 (border) vs 1.515 (non-border) |
Partial support |
| H2: Border districts have weaker pipeline outcomes | Descriptives: 0.130 vs 0.098 violations/inspection, 145.2 vs 122.8 days, 0.543 vs 0.596 resolution; RQ1 border_district -> violations_per_inspection = 0.0434, p = 0.0949 |
Supported descriptively, mixed regression support |
| H3: Border-specific post-2019 level shift | RQ2 post_2019:border -> avg_days_to_enforcement = -74.5893, p = 0.0156; other outcomes null |
Supported for timing only |
| H4: Border-specific post-2019 trend shift | RQ2 post_trend:border terms: inspection p = 0.8181, violations p = 0.8350, timing p = 0.9252, resolution p = 0.3404 |
Not supported in baseline model |
The hypothesis tests indicate the clearest inferential signal is a border-specific post-2019 timing level shift, consistent with "faster pipeline, not wider pipeline."
Figure Callouts
Figure 1 (group trends): analysis/output_borderlands/border_vs_nonborder_trends.png
Figure 2 (main timing figure with CI): analysis/output_borderlands/money_plot_timing_border_prepost2019.png
Figure 2 uses district-year means with equal district weighting:
\bar{Y}_{gt} = \frac{1}{n_{gt}} \sum_{d \in g} Y_{dt}, \quad
CI_{95\%} = \bar{Y}_{gt} \pm 1.96 \cdot \frac{s_{gt}}{\sqrt{n_{gt}}}
Discussion
The findings are consistent with a transparency-throughput mechanism: disclosure-era pressure appears to accelerate processing where baseline constraints are stronger, but this does not map cleanly to expansion of enforcement reach or follow-through. The strongest claim supported by this design is "faster pipeline, not wider pipeline."
The contribution is a boundary condition argument: transparency reforms can produce uneven administrative effects across territorial governance contexts, with timing responsiveness exceeding capacity expansion.
The design does not identify interstate strategic competition. A full Neil Woods-style test requires district-year competitor stringency series and explicit enforcement-gap dynamics. That's the next step in the research agenda, but the current analysis provides a necessary first step by establishing the presence of border-specific enforcement gaps and their heterogeneous response to disclosure reform.